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Abstract
We theoretically and experimentally analyze the role of veriﬁability and privacy in strategic
performance feedback using a “one principal-two agent” context with real effort. We conﬁrm
the theoretical prediction that information transmission occurs only in veriﬁable feedback mech-
anisms and private-veriﬁable feedback is the most informative mechanism. Yet, subjects also
exhibit some behavior that cannot be explained by our baseline model, such as telling the truth
even when this will deﬁnitely hurt them, interpreting “no feedback” more optimistically than they
should, and being inﬂuenced by feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with
individual-speciﬁc lying costs and naive agents can account for some, but not all, of these ﬁnd-
ings. We conclude that although agents do take into account the principal’s strategic behavior to
form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, they are overly optimistic and interpret positive feedback to
the other agent more pessimistically than they should.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a theoretical and experimental study of the role of veriﬁability and privacy in the
strategic communication of interim performance information. Performance feedback (also known
as performance review or performance appraisal) is one of the most commonly used management
practices. Almost every organization, be it a major corporation, a small company, a high school, or a
hospital uses some form of performance feedback.1 Although it is considered an indispensable part
of any organization, performance feedback has also been the object of a heated debate. Employees
usually dread it and many business experts and consultants are ﬁerce opponents. One of the most
critical voices, Samuel Culbert, states that “[i]t’s a negative to corporate performance, an obstacle to
straight-talk relationships, and a prime cause of low morale at work.”(Culbert [2008]).
Ideally, performance feedback gives an unbiased report on past performance and provides guid-
ance regarding how to improve future performance. This aspect, i.e., accuracy or unbiased commu-
nication, has been regarded as a crucial aspect of performance feedback. In practice, however, the
accuracy of feedback may be tainted due to various biases that arise from the evaluator’s self-interest.
In particular, supervisors may be vague in their assessments or avoid giving negative feedback to their
subordinates for strategic reasons.2 Forced ranking systems may overcome this deﬁciency but they
cause problems of their own, potentially undermining employee conﬁdence and motivation.
Clearly, there are various pros and cons of performance feedback along a multitude of dimen-
sions, but its effectiveness as a tool of communication seems to be one of the most contentious as-
pects. In this paper we focus on precisely this aspect. In a setting where feedback is given strategically
by a supervisor, we theoretically and experimentally analyze how subordinates interpret the feedback
they receive in forming an opinion of themselves and whether feedback communicates the actual
performance information in a truthful manner.
In our experiment there is a supervisor (called principal) and two subordinates (called agents)
who work for (potentially) two periods. In each period agents perform a real effort task and succeed if
their performance is greater than a randomly determined threshold, which plays the role of chance or
other unpredictable exogenous factors such as market conditions and organizational standards. The
principal, and only the principal, observes the ﬁrst-period performance (i.e., success or failure) of
the agents and then decides whether and what type of feedback to provide to the agents. The agents
observe the feedback (or lack thereof), update their beliefs about their likelihood of succeeding in the
second period, and choose whether to perform the task again in the second period or not.3
The agents receive monetary payoff from their performances in the two periods, while the prin-
cipal receives a payoff only from the agents’ second-period performances. In addition, the princi-
pal’s payoff depends on the minimum of the two agents’ performances. That is, the principal ob-
1One source estimates that “97.2% of U.S. companies have performance appraisals, as do 91% of companies worldwide”
(see “Should Performance Reviews Be Fired?"). Also see evidence cited in Murphy and Cleveland [1991].
2See Schraeder et al. [2007] for a summary of research in psychology, management, and organizational behavior. Culbert
[2008] claims that “any critique [involved in performance review] is as much an expression of the evaluator’s self-interests
as it is a subordinate’s attributes or imperfections.” Longenecker et al. [1987] report (interview) evidence that the main
concern of the executives in performance appraisals is not accuracy but rather to motivate and reward subordinates. Ac-
cordingly, they systematically inﬂate the ratings in order to increase performance. In the Forbes article titled “Ten Biggest
Mistakes Bosses Make In Performance Reviews,” the number 1 item is ‘Too vague,’ number 2 is ‘Everything’s perfect – until
it’s not and you’re ﬁred,’ while number 8 is ‘Not being truthful with employees about their performance’ (Jackson [2012]).
3More precisely, subjects state the probability with which they believe they will succeed in the second-period task, which
is elicited using a Becker-De Groot-Marschak type procedure.
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tains an extra payoff only if both agents end up performing in the second-period task. This captures
“weakest-link” type performance settings, where it is important that every agent achieve a certain
level of performance. With such a payoff function, the principal prefers both agents to have a high
perceived likelihood of success in the second-period task, i.e., to have high self-conﬁdence. This
also makes feedback a strategic choice: if the ﬁrst-period performance is positively correlated with
second-period performance, then the principal has an incentive to get the agents to believe that they
succeeded in the ﬁrst period task.4
We analyze the effectiveness of performance feedback mechanisms along two dimensions: (1)
veriﬁability of the feedback; (2) privacy of the feedback. Our baseline scenario is truthful private
feedback, in which each agent privately and truthfully learns whether he succeeded in the ﬁrst period
task or not. In the veriﬁable feedback case, the principal has to reveal the true performance or reveal
no information at all, while in unveriﬁable feedback, she may lie about performance without incur-
ring any monetary cost. The feedback may be private, in which case each agent receives feedback
only about his own performance, or public, in which case both agents observe the feedback on each
agent’s performance. Therefore, in addition to the baseline scenario, we have four different treat-
ments: (1) private-veriﬁable; (2) public-veriﬁable; (3) private-unveriﬁable; (4) public-unveriﬁable.
In reality, some performance measures are indeed objective and hence veriﬁable, while others
are subjective and unveriﬁable. For example, a supervisor may have access to evaluations - by higher
ranking administrators, co-workers, customers, or students - that can be reproduced if needed. Simi-
larly, sales or productivity ﬁgures, customer ratings, exam grades of students, and long-term mortality
rates after surgeries are all objectively measurable and veriﬁable performance measures. Subjective
or judgmental evaluations by supervisors, on the other hand, are by their very nature unveriﬁable,
i.e., cheap talk. Likewise, feedback is sometimes provided in a private manner, as in many perfor-
mance review interviews, while in other cases it is public, as in ‘employee of the month’ types of
feedback. The question of whether feedback should be provided publicly is especially relevant for
contexts where it is important to preserve the “morale” of all agents. Given that most organizations
have some freedom in determining their feedback mechanisms along the lines we consider, our re-
sults can have signiﬁcant policy implications for ﬁrms and for educational settings.
In Section 4 we analyze a theoretical model and derive several predictions. Our main prediction is
that information transmission occurs only in veriﬁable feedback mechanisms and private-veriﬁable
feedback is the most informative feedback mechanism. Section 5.1 presents strong evidence in sup-
port of this prediction. We therefore conclude that, if effective communication is the main objective,
organizations should try to provide measurable and veriﬁable forms of feedback and they would be
better off if they do this privately.
We also ﬁnd that positive and negative feedback have signiﬁcant effects on beliefs in all treat-
ments except private-unveriﬁable feedback, whereas giving no feedback has no signiﬁcant effect on
beliefs. Since “no feedback” must be interpreted as bad news, especially in veriﬁable feedback mech-
anisms, this ﬁnding contradicts the predictions of our model.
Our data provides evidence that when feedback is public, agents’ beliefs about their likelihood of
4The experiment is designed so that the likelihood of success for each agent is independent of the likelihood of success
for the other agent. This implies that the performance of the other agent is not informative about the likelihood of own suc-
cess. Furthermore, feedback has no direct payoff consequences, which lets us isolate the communication phase involved
in the feedback process from other strategic considerations.
2
success are inﬂuencedby the feedback provided to the other agent. More precisely, they becomemore
optimistic if the other agent receives negative feedback and less optimistic if the other agent receives
positive feedback. We further ﬁnd that this effect is signiﬁcant only when own feedback is positive,
and stronger for public-unveriﬁable than for public-veriﬁable feedback. Since, in our experimental
design, the other agent’s performance has no informative content regarding own performance, these
ﬁndings are also at odds with our model.
Finally, we ﬁnd a positive effect of beliefs but no signiﬁcant effect of feedback on performance.
In other words, performance reviews are at most a weak instrument for boosting employee perfor-
mance.
In Section 5.2, we analyze principals’ behavior and ﬁnd that, in all the treatments, some (but not
all) subjects tell the truth. This goes against our prediction that in unveriﬁable feedback mechanisms,
principals should always provide positive feedback. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that principals expect pos-
itive feedback to be interpreted more optimistically and negative feedback more pessimistically than
they actually are. In other words, some of them give bad news even though they actually believe that
it will be interpreted as such, which leads us to conclude that lying imposes individual-speciﬁc costs.
In Section 6.1 we extend our baseline model to include individual-speciﬁc costs of lying and naive
agents. We show that it can account for most of our empirical ﬁndings as well as some of the above
discrepancies between the baseline model and the data. In particular, the extended model predicts
that all principals will report truthfully if the agent is successful, but if the agent has failed, then some
will still report truthfully but the rest will lie if they can, or give no feedback.
Interestingly, the model also shows that in public-unveriﬁable feedback, it is indeed rational for
an agent who received positive feedback to be inﬂuenced adversely by the other agent’s positive feed-
back. This is because, in equilibrium, the principal provides positive feedback to, say, agent 1 and
negative feedback to agent 2 only when the outcome is success for agent 1 and failure for agent 2,
whereas she provides positive feedback to both agents after all four possible outcomes, which in-
cludes failure for agent 1. A similar effect, however, does not exist if own feedback is negative, which is
also in line with the evidence. This still does not explain why this effect also exists in public-veriﬁable
feedback. However, the fact that it is stronger in public-unveriﬁable feedback and signiﬁcant only
when own feedback is positive indicates that agents do consider the principal’s strategy in forming
their beliefs.
We address this issue in more detail in Section 6.2 by comparing agents’ actual post-feedback
beliefs with hypothetical beliefs that a Bayesian agent would form if he perfectly predicted the (em-
pirical) strategy used by the principals. Our analysis suggests that Bayesian updating plays a signif-
icant role in the formation of beliefs, but agents are, on average, overly optimistic in responding to
their own feedback and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they
should.
Overall, we conclude that private-veriﬁable feedback is the most informative mechanism while
unveriﬁable feedback is not informative, and public feedback interferes with the informativeness of
positive feedback, especially when it is unveriﬁable.
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2 Related Literature
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst comprehensive study that explores, both theoretically
and experimentally, the impact of veriﬁability and audience on strategic information transmission
in a realistic performance feedback context. Previous theoretical and experimental studies of per-
formance feedback have mostly focused on the effects of truthful feedback on effort decisions and
future performance. Theoretical work has generally used principal-agent models to study optimal
information revelation mechanisms under the assumption of truthful feedback, taking into account
the effects of the feedback on agents’ actions (see, for example, Ertac [2005], Ederer [2010], Aoyagi
[2010]). The experimental literature has mostly studied the motivational effects of truthful perfor-
mance feedback in both organizational and educational settings and documented varying results.
With ﬂat wages, the majority of papers ﬁnd that provision of relative performance feedback leads to
higher effort on average, whereas evidence is more mixed in performance-pay settings.5 Our major
departure from this literature is that we consider strategic rather than truthful feedback and focus on
the communication aspects.
Ederer and Fehr [2009] is one of the few experimental papers that study strategic performance
feedback. They analyze the effect of private-unveriﬁable feedback on (induced) effort in a dynamic
tournament with two agents. In their setting, the principal has an incentive to underreport the true
performance difference between the agents. Hence, relative performance feedback should be com-
pletely uninformative and agents should not respond to feedback in equilibrium. In contrast, their
results show that even though agents discount the information they receive from the principal, they
still respond to it and some principals provide feedback that is close to the truth while others consis-
tently underreport.6
In our private-unveriﬁable feedback treatment, we ﬁnd a similar result to Ederer and Fehr [2009]
in the sense that some principals tell the truth while others lie; however, in our case, agents heav-
ily discount such feedback, which renders it uninformative. From a design perspective, our work is
distinct from Ederer and Fehr [2009], as well as from the other papers in this literature, along several
lines: (1) We vary treatments along the dimensions of both audience and veriﬁability and study their
interaction, while Ederer and Fehr [2009] study only private-unveriﬁable feedback. This enables us
to compare different feedback mechanisms along dimensions that may be discretionary in organi-
zational and educational settings and to draw policy conclusions; (2) We study a non-tournament
setting where information about the other agent’s performance is irrelevant. These two aspects of
our research allow us to uncover, both theoretically and experimentally, a novel ﬁnding: When feed-
back is public and the other agent receives positive feedback, agents interpret their own feedback
more pessimistically - apparently by making inferences about the principal’s strategy. Furthermore,
this effect is stronger if feedback is unveriﬁable and own feedback is also positive; (3) We measure the
impact of feedback directly on beliefs, rather than effort, using an incentive-compatible mechanism
that is also robust to risk aversion. This allows us to isolate, in a clean manner, the strategic communi-
5See, among others, Azmat and Iriberri [2010], Azmat and Iriberri [2012], Bandiera et al. [2010], Blanes i Vidal and Nossol
[2011], Charness et al. [2010], Eriksson et al. [2009], Gerhards and Siemer [2014], Gill et al. [2015], and Kuhnen and Tymula
[2012].
6In a one principal/one agent setting with unveriﬁable feedback and induced effort, Mohnen and Manthei [2006] ﬁnd
similar results: Some principals tell the truth but deception is also widespread. Rosaz [2012] also studies unveriﬁable feed-
back in a one principal/one agent setting, but limits the principal’s ability to lie. She ﬁnds that the principal indeed manip-
ulates the feedback but the agent increases effort in response.
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cation aspect of performance feedback, which is the main focus of this paper; (4) We use a real, rather
than induced, effort setting, which creates an ego-relevant environment that should contribute to the
external validity of our results.7
Gürtler and Harbring [2010] also study the effect of performance feedback on effort in a tourna-
ment setting, but unlike in Ederer and Fehr [2009], feedback is public and veriﬁable in their design.
The theory, in this case, predicts that agents should interpret no feedback as bad news and full revela-
tion of relative performance should occur. They ﬁnd that although there is evidence that no feedback
is regarded as bad news, the effect on effort is not as strong as the theory predicts.
Veriﬁable feedback mechanisms induce a strategic communication game that is known as a “dis-
closure” (or persuasion) game in the literature, pioneered by Grossman [1981] and Milgrom [1981],
while unveriﬁable feedback mechanisms induce what is known as a “cheap talk” game, ﬁrst stud-
ied by Crawford and Sobel [1982].8 Therefore, our paper is also related to the literature that experi-
mentally tests the predictions of cheap talk and disclosure games. In these strands of the literature,
Dickhaut et al. [1995] and Cai and Wang [2006] ﬁnd support for the qualitative predictions of the ba-
sic cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel [1982], i.e., less information is transmitted as preferences
of the sender and the receiver diverge, and Battaglini and Makarov [2010] ﬁnd overall support for the
predictions of Farrell and Gibbons [1989], which extends the basic model to the case of multiple re-
ceivers. Blume et al. [2001], Cai and Wang [2006], and Battaglini and Makarov [2010] ﬁnd evidence
for over-communication, i.e., a tendency for the senders to reveal more information than predicted
by theory as well as a tendency for the receivers to rely on the information sent by the senders.9
Drugov et al. [2013] test the two-receiver model by using ﬁve states rather than two and, similar to
our setting, also run a private communication mode. They report evidence of a disciplining effect of
public communication.10
The experimental literature on the strategic communication of veriﬁable information is smaller.
Early work on experimental tests of disclosure games has studied disclosure in the context of mar-
kets, where the seller is better-informed and discloses quality to the buyer(s). Forsythe et al. [1989]
ﬁnd that full information revelation is achieved, but only as subjects become more sophisticated over
repeated rounds of play. King and Wallin [1991] analyze a market setting where the seller may or
may not be informed, which is unknown to the buyers, and ﬁnd that full disclosure does not occur.
Forsythe et al. [1999] ﬁnd that imposing “anti-fraud” rules that constrain message sets to include the
true state improves efﬁciency in comparison to cheap talk messages. More recently, Benndorf et al.
7This obviously has a cost in terms of control over unobservables and makes the match with theory more difﬁcult. Since
the focus of our work is not the effect of feedback on effort, we believe that the beneﬁts of using real effort outweigh the
costs.
8We discuss the relevant theoretical literature in Section 4.
9Cai and Wang [2006] explains this over-communication behavior using level-k behavior and quantal response equilib-
rium. Using information from eye-tracking technology, Wang et al. [2010] shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that
is consistent with a level-k model. However, over-communication that persists over rounds, as in Blume et al. [2001] is
difﬁcult to explain by level-k reasoning. A potential explanation for over-communication on the part of senders is “lying
aversion”. Gneezy [2005] reports experimental evidence that subjects have a tendency to tell the truth even if it is against
their material interests. Gneezy et al. [2013] study the same question using a new method and ﬁnd that subjects are het-
erogenous with regard to their tendency to lie. See Charness and Dufwenberg [2006], Hurkens and Kartik [2009], Sutter
[2009], Sanchez-Pages and Vorsatz [2009], Abeler et al. [2012], and Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi [2013] for further experi-
mental evidence on lying aversion.
10See Crawford [1998] for an early survey of experimental work on strategic communication. There is also more recent ex-
perimental work on extensions of the basic cheap talk model to multiple dimensions and multiple senders, such as Lai et al.
[2015] and Vespa and Wilson [2015].
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[2015] ﬁnd, in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their
productivity, that revelation takes place less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. The experi-
mental context and decision settings used in these papers (e.g., asset markets, auction context) tend
to include elements that may affect behavior independently of the basic strategic considerations in
veriﬁable information disclosure. Jin et al. [2015] use a more direct test of the “no news is bad news”
prediction in disclosure games, and ﬁnd that receivers do not interpret no information sufﬁciently
negatively. Hagenbach and Perez-Richet [2015] test the predictions of Hagenbach et al. [2014] by con-
sidering payoff structures for the sender that are not necessarily monotonic in the receiver’s action,
and ﬁnd thatwhether the game is cyclic or acyclicmatters for the receivers in forming skeptical beliefs
and thereby for information transmission.
While some of our results, such as the tendency to tell the truth with unveriﬁable feedback and in-
sufﬁcient strategic discounting of no feedback with veriﬁable feedback are also reported in the exist-
ing experimental studies of strategic communication, our work is distinct along several dimensions.
First, we elicit agents’ beliefs and principal’s expectations on agents’ beliefs directly, while previous
work has studied the effect of information on other strategic choices, which may be confounded by
risk aversion or other factors speciﬁc to the decision environment. This allows us to more clearly
focus on the motives behind giving feedback and its interpretation.11 Second, previous work has
tested the predictions of cheap talk or disclosure games usually by varying the preferences of the
players, while we take the preferences as ﬁxed and vary both veriﬁability and audience. As we have
mentioned before, this allows us to study the interaction between these two dimensions and leads to
novel ﬁndings. Third, our main purpose is to test informativeness of different performance feedback
mechanisms in a real-effort context, while the previous work has either used a neutral framework to
test game theoretical predictions or studied other speciﬁc environments such as auctions or labor
markets.
3 Experimental Design
The experimental design is based on studying interim performance feedback in a one principal-two
agent real effort context. The performance feedback technology available to the principal is the treat-
ment variable, and we study ﬁve treatments in a within-subject design. Therefore, the experiment
consists of ﬁve periods with each period corresponding to a different feedback mechanism, and
within each period there are two rounds. To eliminate potential wealth effects, we use a random
payment scheme, i.e., one of the ten rounds is chosen randomly and subjects are paid according to
their payoffs in the chosen round.
At the start of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned to the roles of either “Principal”
or “Agent”, and these roles do not change. In each period, 3-person groups, which consist of one
principal and two agents, are formed. We use a “strangers” matching protocol, where new groups are
randomly formed at the start of every period.
11This feature of the design relates the paper to the experimental literature on the effects of noisy but non-strategic feed-
back on beliefs. Our ﬁnding that agents respond to feedback more optimistically than they should is in line with and com-
plements the ﬁndings in this literature that subjects may process information differently and exhibit biases of asymmetry
or conservatism (in comparison to Bayesian updating) when the context is ego-relevant (Ertac [2011], Eil and Rao [2011],
Mobius et al. [2011]). However, we study feedback that is provided strategically, which makes a difference because, as we
will show, many principals indeed act strategically and agents take that into account in updating their beliefs.
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For participants in the role of agents, we use two different real-effort tasks: an addition task and
a verbal task (see Appendix B for details). The verbal task consists of general knowledge questions as
well as verbal classiﬁcation and number-letter matching questions. The addition task involves adding
four or ﬁve two-digit numbers.
In each period, agents are randomly assigned to one of these tasks and perform the same task in
both rounds of that period. For both tasks, subjects are asked to solve as many questions as possible
within a limited time (2 mins.). At the end of each round, the number of correct answers is compared
to a “target score”, randomly determined for that speciﬁc period.12 The same target score is employed
in both rounds of the period. If a subject’s score is greater than or equal to the target score, the subject
is “successful”, and has failed otherwise. Note that the target score is subject-speciﬁc and there is no
common shock applied to the performance of subjects.
3.1 Belief elicitation
To elicit self-conﬁdence, we use a crossover mechanism developed independently by Karni [2009]
and Mobius et al. [2011], which is a Becker-De Groot-Marschak-type procedure for eliciting beliefs
truthfully and independently of risk preferences. In this mechanism, subjects are presented with two
alternative lotteries to determine their second-round payoff. In the performance-based lottery, the
reward is based on the agent’s second-round performance. That is, the agent receives the reward
if his outcome is “successful” in the second-round performance stage. In the chance-based lottery,
the agent earns the reward with probability X , regardless of his second-round performance. At the
end of the ﬁrst performance round, subjects are asked to report the minimum probability of win-
ning in the chance-based lottery that would make them willing to choose the chance-based lottery
as opposed to the performance-based one. The computer then draws X randomly. If the randomly
drawn X is at least as large as the agent’s stated minimum, the chance lottery applies. Otherwise,
the agent is rewarded based on his second-round performance. This mechanism gives agents an in-
centive to truthfully report the subjective probability with which they think they will succeed in the
second round. In order to study the within-person effect of performance feedback on beliefs, we ask
the subjects to make this decision twice: once before and once after receiving feedback. To main-
tain incentive compatibility, we randomly choose either the pre-feedback or post-feedback beliefs to
determine whether the performance or chance mechanism will be implemented.
The timeline of a period for agents is as follows:
1. Pre-feedback performance: Subjects perform the assigned task within 2 minutes.
2. Pre-feedback beliefs: Without receiving any information, subjects state the minimum proba-
bility of winning that would induce them to leave their second-round payoff to chance.
3. Feedback: Feedback is received, in the form of a message whose content changes between
treatments, as will be explained in Section 3.2.
4. Post-feedback beliefs: After seeing the message (or no message), subjects are allowed to update
their previously reported beliefs. (At this stage, the subjects can see their previously reported
beliefs on the screen.)
12The target score is a number which is randomly chosen from the interval [4,13] at the beginning of each period. The
range of the target score was determined based on data from a pilot session.
7
5. Performance/chance mechanism: If the self-reported probability of winning (either pre- or
post-feedback, depending on which was selected) is higher than the probability of winning
in the chance mechanism (drawn by the computer), then the subject performs the same type
of task for two minutes again, as in the ﬁrst round. Otherwise, they do not perform the task,
and their second-round payoff is determined by chance, according to the winning probability
drawn by the computer.
3.2 Feedback mechanism
Note that after the ﬁrst round, agents do not have exact knowledge of whether they were successful,
although they will have subjective beliefs. Principals, on the other hand, observe the true ﬁrst-round
outcomes (success or failure) of the two agents they have been matched with. After stating their
priors, agents may receive a message about whether they were successful in the ﬁrst round. There
are ﬁve types of feedback mechanisms used throughout the experiment, which differ in the provider,
audience, and content of the feedback. In terms of content, we have the following types:
1. Truthful feedback: In this mechanism, subjects receive an accurate message (success or failure)
from the computer. This is the baseline mechanism in our design.
2. Veriﬁable feedback: In this mechanism, performance feedback is reported by the principal. The
principal can choose either to transmit the true outcome (success or failure), or to withhold the
information. Sent messages always have to be correct, and agents know that there can be no
deception.
3. Unveriﬁable feedback (cheap talk): As in the veriﬁable mechanism, the feedback comes from
the principal, but she does not have to report the actual outcome, i.e., she can lie. In addition,
she has an option to send no message.
Within the veriﬁable and unveriﬁable mechanisms, we also employ two different feedback types that
differ in the audience of the messages:
1. Private feedback: In this mechanism, the principal reports the feedback independently and
privately to the agents, and agents only see the message targeted to them.
2. Public feedback: In this mechanism, the principal has to announce the feedback publicly. That
is, each agent observes the other agent’s message, in addition to his own.
This design leaves us with ﬁve different feedback treatments, which are implemented within-subject:
truthful feedback, private-veriﬁable feedback, public-veriﬁable feedback, private-unveriﬁable feed-
back, and public-unveriﬁable feedback. In the public-veriﬁable case, the principal has to decide ei-
ther to release the truthful outcome to both of the agents publicly, or to withhold the information.
On the other hand, in the public-unveriﬁable case, the feedback for each agent is chosen separately
from the three options explained above (success, failure or no information) and the messages for both
agents are delivered publicly to all.
Finally, in order to get a better insight into the feedback strategy employed by the principals, they
are asked to guess agents’ post-feedback beliefs.
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3.3 Payoffs
The payoffs of participants in the role of agents depend on their performance outcomes as well as
their decisions. To incentivize performance in the ﬁrst round, we use differential rewards based on a
performance target: 300 ECU (experimental currency unit), if the agent succeeds, and 100 ECU, if he
fails. (1 ECU = 0.06 Turkish Liras (TL).)
In the second round, if the agent ends up doing the task, his payoff depends on whether he suc-
ceeds or fails, exactly as in the ﬁrst round. If, however, the agent ends up with the chance mechanism,
then his second-round earnings are 300 ECU with probability X , and 100 ECU with probability (1−X ),
where X is the randomly chosen probability of winning.
The principal’s payoff, on the other hand, depends on the second-round entry behavior and per-
formance outcomes of the two agents. For the principal, we use a payoff function in which the per-
formances of the two agents are complements. Speciﬁcally, the payoff function is:
Vt =
⎧⎨
⎩
100, t = 2n−1
50+10(g1t + g2t )+min{q1t ,q2t }, t = 2n
where n ∈ {1,2,3,4,5} is the period number, qi t is the return from the second-round performance of
agent i in period t , and gi t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the principal’s guess in
period t for agent i is correct, i.e., in the ± 5 interval of agent’s actual belief, 0 otherwise. Return from
the performance of agent i in period t is equal to
qi t (ci t ,ei t )=
⎧⎨
⎩
20∗ ci t , ei t = 1
0, ei t = 0
where ci t denotes the number of correct answers of agent i in period t , while ei t represents the en-
try of agent i to the performance stage (as opposed to taking the chance mechanism). In the ﬁrst
round the principal’s payoff is a constant amount, 100 ECU. The second-round payoff is composed of
three elements: a constant amount, 50 ECU, an extra 10 ECU for each correct guess about the agents’
beliefs, and the minimum of the returns from both agents. As can be seen from the above payoff
function, for the principal to earn an extra return over the ﬁxed endowment, both agents must end
up doing the task. This, together with complementarity, implies that the principal should aim to (1)
convince both agents that they are likely to succeed in the second round task, and (2) maximize the
post-feedback performance of the worst-performing agent in the second round.
3.4 Procedures
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher [2007]), and
implemented at the Koç University and Bilgi University computer labs in the Spring term of 2013.
We collected data from 132 subjects in total (72 subjects from Koç University and 60 subjects from
Bilgi University). The experiment was conducted in 13 sessions, with 8 sessions at Koç University and
5 sessions at Bilgi University. Our sample consists of 68 male and 64 female participants, who are
mostly undergraduates. At the end of each session, we conducted a survey to collect demographic
data such as age, gender, major and GPA (see Appendix B). In order to mitigate potential order effects,
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we used 6 different conﬁgurations that differ in the sequence of treatments.13 Sessions lasted about
50 minutes, and subjects earned between 15 TL and 28 TL (on average 20.23 TL), including a show-up
fee.
4 Theory and Predictions
In this section we will analyze a stylized model of our experimental design and derive theoretical pre-
dictions that will form the basis for the empirical analysis in Section 5. There are two agents, indexed
by i = 1,2, and a principal, denoted by P . For each agent i , a state of the world θi is realized and
observed only by the principal. In our experimental design, this state corresponds to either “success”
or “failure”, denoted by s and f , respectively. We assume that states are independently distributed
across agents and the probability of success for agent i is equal to pi ∈ (0,1). We will also assume for
simplicity of exposition that s and f are real numbers with s > f .
After observing (θ1,θ2), the principal provides feedback to the agents. As we have explained in
Section 3, this feedback might be veriﬁable, in which case, the principal cannot lie but still choose to
give no information, ormight be unveriﬁable, i.e., might be cheap talk, inwhich case the principal can
lie about the actual state of the world or provide no information. Feedback is either private, in which
case the principal provides feedback on θi to each agent i independently and privately, or public, in
which case both agents observe the common feedback about (θ1,θ2). After receiving feedback, each
agent independently chooses an action and the game ends. In our experimental design, this action
corresponds to the choice made by the agent in the belief elicitation round. As we have explained
before, our belief elicitation mechanism is designed so that it is optimal for each agent to choose the
probability with which he believes that he will be successful in the second-round task.
Payoff function of agent i is given by ui (ai ,θi ), where ai ∈ Ai is the action choice of agent i and Ai
is a compact and convex set of real numbers. Principal’s payoff function is v(a,θ), where a = (a1,a2)
and θ = (θ1,θ2). We assume that players are expected payoff maximizers. If agent i believes that he
is successful, i.e., θi = s, with probability μi , his expected payoff is equal to Ui (ai ,μi ) = μi ui (ai , s)+
(1−μi )ui (ai , f ). We assume that, for each μi ∈ [0,1] there is a unique maximizer ofU (ai ,μi ), denoted
a∗i (μi ), which is in the interior of Ai and strictly increasing in μi . From now on, whenever we say that
agent i has high beliefs we mean that μi is high.
We also assume that the principal’s payoff function is strictly increasing in ai , i = 1,2. This makes
feedback a strategically important choice for the principal because she has an incentive to induce a
high belief by each agent. This, of course, may render her feedback unreliable in equilibrium and
the extent to which this happens may depend on the feedback technology itself, i.e., whether the
feedback is private or public and veriﬁable or not. The main theoretical issue we deal with in this
section is the informativeness of the feedback provided by the principal in these different cases.
Denote the set of states as Θ = { f , s} and the set of messages that can be potentially sent by the
principal as M = { f , s,}, where  denotes no information. Let M (θ) be the set of messages that are
feasible when the the state is θ = (θ1,θ2). The following describes the set of strategies available to the
principal under different treatments:
13The conﬁgurations were as follows: TVU, TUV, VUT, UVT, VTU and UTV, where T, V and U correspond to Truthful,
Veriﬁable and Unveriﬁable feedback mechanisms, respectively.
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1. Private Feedback: A pure strategy of the principal is a pair of functions ρ = (ρ1,ρ2
)
, where ρi :
Θ2 → Mi (θ). If feedback is unveriﬁable, then Mi (θ) = M , i.e., there are no restrictions on the
feasible messages. If feedback is veriﬁable, then Mi (θ) = {θi ,}, i.e., principal either tells the
truth or provides no information to an agent.
2. Public Feedback: A pure strategy of the principal is a function ρ :Θ→M (θ). If feedback is un-
veriﬁable, then M (θ) = M2, i.e., there are no restrictions on the feasible messages. If feedback
is veriﬁable, then M (θ) = {θ,}, i.e., principal either tells the truth or provides no information
to both agents.
After observing feedback r , agent i forms beliefs on the state of the world μi (r ) ∈ [0,1]2 and chooses
an action αi (r ) ∈ Ai . Let μii denote the probability that agent i ’s beliefs put on the event θi = s and
μ−ii the probability on θ−i = s. Let μ =
(
μ1,μ2
)
and α = (α1,α2) denote, respectively, an agent belief
proﬁle and strategy proﬁle. An assessment is composed of a strategy for each player and beliefs by
the agents:
(
ρ,α,μ
)
.
An assessment is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) if strategies are optimal given beliefs and
beliefs are formed by using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In what follows we will analyze the set
of pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of each extensive form game deﬁned by one of the four
possible feedback mechanisms: (1) private-veriﬁable; (2) public-veriﬁable; (3) private-unveriﬁable;
(4) public-unveriﬁable.
A veriﬁable feedback mechanism induces a game of strategic communication known as a “disclo-
sure game”, pioneered by Grossman [1981] and Milgrom [1981], while an unveriﬁable feedback mech-
anism induces a “cheap talk game”, introducedbyCrawford and Sobel [1982]. These basicmodels and
the main results have been later generalized and extended in several directions.14 Most relevant for us
are Farrell and Gibbons [1989] and Koessler [2008], both of which consider a two-receiver, two-state,
and two-action model and analyze public and private communication. Farrell and Gibbons [1989]
consider only the cheap talk case, while Koessler [2008] extends it to veriﬁable messages. Our model
differs from theirs in that the state is multidimensional (which is formally equivalent to four states)
and there is a continuum of actions. None of our results on public feedback follows directly from the
analyses in these two papers, but the reasoning behind the existence of partially informative equilib-
rium in public-veriﬁable feedback is similar to the case of the mutual subversion in Koessler [2008],
and the partially informative equilibrium in public-unveriﬁable feedback resembles the mutual dis-
cipline case in Farrell and Gibbons [1989].15
4.1 Veriﬁable Feedback
Each agent has (or updates) his beliefs regarding the other agent’s type as well as his own type. How-
ever, since types are independent and only own type affects payoffs, what matters strategically is only
beliefs on own type. Accordingly, we say that an equilibrium is fully informative if each agent can
14For the literature on disclosure games see Seidmann and Winter [1997], Mathis [2008], Giovannoni and Seidmann
[2007], and Hagenbach et al. [2014]. The basic cheap talk model in Crawford and Sobel [1982] has also been extended in
many directions. See Sobel [2013] for a recent survey of this large literature.
15We should also mention Goltsman and Pavlov [2011], which generalizes Crawford and Sobel [1982] to the case of two
receivers with different preferences and compares public with private feedback. Again, our model’s state space and payoff
structure are different in a way that makes direct application of their results impossible.
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infer his type from the principal’s report and completely uninformative if agents learn nothing about
their own type.
Our ﬁrst result shows that if feedback is veriﬁable, then agents receive perfect information about
their own types.
Proposition 1. If feedback is private and veriﬁable, then all equilibria are fully informative.
Proof. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition 1 is very easy. If feedback is veriﬁable and the principal learns that an agent
is successful, then she can simply send the message that he is successful and induce the best beliefs
and the highest action on the part of that agent. Since feedback is veriﬁable, the other type of the
principal, i.e., the type who observed that the agent has failed cannot mimic this feedback. This full
revelation result is well known in the literature and follows from two aspects of our model: (1) every
type has a message that only that type can send; (2) the principal’s payoff is monotonic in each agent’s
beliefs.
In public feedback, the principal cannot change her reporting strategy regarding one agent’s per-
formance without the other agent observing this change. This creates the main difference between
private and public feedback for equilibrium analysis. Indeed, if feedback is public and veriﬁable,
then full information revelation is an equilibrium but, in contrast to private feedback, there is also a
partially informative equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If feedback is public and veriﬁable, then in equilibrium there is either full information
revelation or ρ(s, s)= (s, s) and ρ(θ)= for all θ = (s, s).
It is easy to construct a fully revealing equilibrium by specifying strategies ρ(θ) = θ for all θ and
beliefs as μi ()= 0 for i = 1,2. The following example shows that there is also a partially informative
equilibrium.16
Example 1. Let s = 7, f = 1, pi = 1/2, and payoff functions be ui (ai ,θi ) = θi ai − 12a2i and v(a,θ) =
a1a2w (min{θ1,θ2}), where w is a strictly increasing function with w(1)> 0. It can be shown that the
following assessment is an equilibrium: ρ(s, s)= (s, s), ρ(θ)= for all θ = (s, s), μii (θ)= 1 if θi = s and
μii (θ) = 0 otherwise, μii () = 1/3, αi (θ) = θi , αi () = 3. What makes this example work is the form
of the principal’s payoff function, which is similar to the one in our experiment and has the property
that intermediate beliefs by both agents is better for the principal than extreme beliefs. It is easy to
show that this property exists as long as principal’s payoff function is symmetric, concave, and strictly
supermodular in a.17
The above results and Bayes’ rule imply the following prediction:
Prediction A. In veriﬁable feedback:
1. Beliefs increase conditional on success and decrease conditional on failure;
16Results in Milgrom [1981] and Seidmann and Winter [1997] imply that there is an equilibrium with full information
revelation in our game. However, their uniqueness result does not apply to the public feedback case because the action and
the type spaces are multidimensional. In fact, the example shows that there is an equilibrium with less than full information
revelation.
17We should note that the partially informative equilibrium constructed in the example depends on the common knowl-
edge assumption on pi , which may not be satisﬁed in the experiments. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
12
2. Beliefs increase after positive feedback and decrease after negative or no feedback;
3. Beliefs do not depend on the feedback provided to the other agent;
4. If feedback is private, the principal reports truthfully to the agent who succeeds and either reports
truthfully or gives no feedback to the agent who fails. If feedback is public, principal reports
truthfully if both agents succeed and either reports truthfully or gives no feedback if one of the
agents fails.
4.2 Unveriﬁable Feedback
If feedback is unveriﬁable and private, then there is no information transmission in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If feedback is private and unveriﬁable, then all equilibria are completely uninforma-
tive.
Proof of this result is also simple. If some message induces higher beliefs for some agent, then all
types of the principal would have an incentive to send that message, contradicting the hypothesis that
this message induces higher beliefs. This again simply follows from the fact that principal’s payoff is
monotonic in each agent’s beliefs.
If feedback is public, then there is always a completely uninformative equilibrium and never a
fully informative equilibrium. Furthermore, in any equilibrium, types (s, s) and ( f , f ) must always
give the same feedback.
Proposition 4. If feedback is public and unveriﬁable, then there is a completely uninformative equi-
librium. In any equilibrium ρ(s, s)= ρ( f , f ) and hence fully informative equilibrium does not exist.
Therefore, equilibrium is at most partially informative and whether feedback provides any infor-
mation at all, depends on the payoff function of the principal. For instance, in Example 1 all equilibria
are completely uninformative. Since principal’s payoff function in that example is similar to the one
in the experiment, we expect feedback to be uninformative in the experiment as well.
Since messages have no intrinsic meaning and are completely costless in our model, there is no
precise prediction regarding the principal’s strategy and agents’ beliefs after feedback. However, in
our experiment, as well as in real life, reports have a natural meaning and hence it is plausible to
expect that a principal who observes success always reports success. This implies that, in equilib-
rium, the principal who observes failure must also report success. Therefore, we have the following
prediction:
Prediction B. In unveriﬁable feedback:
1. Beliefs do not change conditional on actual state;
2. Beliefs do not change in response to positive feedback and decrease or stay the same after negative
or no feedback;
3. Principal always provides positive feedback.
The above analysis also implies the following prediction:
PredictionC. Private-veriﬁable feedback is themost informativemechanism and private-unveriﬁable
feedback is not informative.
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5 Results
The main focus of our study is whether performance feedback is informative and whether this de-
pends on the veriﬁability and privacy of the feedback. Section 5.1 mainly presents our results on this
issue. Our model also produces theoretical predictions regarding the principal’s behavior in different
treatments. We therefore present a summary of the principals’ behavior in Section 5.2 and discuss
how it ﬁts with the theoretical predictions.
5.1 Analysis of Agents’ Behavior
We start with some summary statistics about task performance. On average (in both rounds), subjects
attempted to solve 8.79 questions in the addition task and 10.47 questions in the verbal task, and cor-
rectly solved 7.08 and 7.82 questions, respectively. The answers to a survey question that asks whether
it is important for subjects to succeed independently of its monetary payoff reveal that a majority of
subjects do care about success per se.18 This shows that we have managed to create an ego-relevant
performance environment for subjects in our experiment, which is important for analyzing belief
updating in a realistic fashion.
We ﬁrst examine the initial (pre-feedback) beliefs of the subjects who have been assigned the role
of an agent. Pre-feedback beliefs show that most agents prefer to perform in the second round: Av-
erage belief is 0.66 while the median is 0.7. In other words, on average, they believe that they will
succeed with probability 0.66 if they were to perform the task. Since only 51% of the subjects success-
fully pass the target score upon entry, we conclude that participants overestimate their performance,
i.e., they are overconﬁdent. This is consistent with results from other real-effort experiments in the
literature (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini [2005]), and highlights the beneﬁt of using real effort, because
in reality, overconﬁdence or self-serving biases may inﬂuence how agents interpret feedback given by
the principal.19
5.1.1 Information Transmission
We start by analyzing how beliefs change conditional on the actual performance outcome of the
agent. If there is information transmission, then beliefs should move up for successful agents and
down for unsuccessful ones. Figure 1 shows that there is information transmission in veriﬁable feed-
back and no information transmission in unveriﬁable feedback cases. Wilcoxon sign-rank tests in-
dicate that the actual outcome has a signiﬁcant effect on agents’ beliefs in truthful and veriﬁable
feedback treatments, while it has no signiﬁcant impact in unveriﬁable feedback treatments.20
[Figure 1 about here.]
18The mean assessment of subjects is 3.73 on a 1-5 scale and 75.84% of them choose either the important or very impor-
tant option (Appendix B.3, question 10).
19In order to ensure that there is no selection bias, we test whether prior beliefs are independent of treatments and order
conﬁgurations, and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences. Neither do we ﬁnd differences in the prior beliefs of Bilgi and Koç
University students. Related regressions are available upon request
20The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for the hypothesis of a zero change in beliefs in each treatment is as follows:
Truthful with p = 0.0002, private-veriﬁable with p = 0.0004, public-veriﬁable with p = 0.013, private-unveriﬁable with p =
0.110, public-unveriﬁable with p = 0.787 for success; truthful with p = 0.0002, private-veriﬁable with p = 0.023, public-
veriﬁable with p = 0.017, private-unveriﬁable with p = 0.696, public-unveriﬁable with p = 0.148 for failure cases.
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Likewise, regression analysis shows that private-veriﬁable feedback is not signiﬁcantly different
from truthful feedback under either success or failure, while public-veriﬁable feedback is signiﬁcantly
different from truthful feedback only under success (and only at the 10% level). In contrast, both types
of unveriﬁable feedback lead to a change in beliefs that is further away from the effect of truthful
feedback (see Table 1).21
[Table 1 about here.]
Finally, Figure 1 and Table 1 show that private-veriﬁable feedback is the closest mechanism to
truthful feedback.
We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows:
Result 1. Veriﬁable feedback is informative while unveriﬁable feedback is not. Private-veriﬁble feed-
back is the most informative mechanism. These results conﬁrm Predictions A.1, B.1, and C.
5.1.2 Impact of Feedback on Beliefs
Figure 2 and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests show that both positive and negative feedback have sig-
niﬁcant (positive and negative, respectively) effects on beliefs in all treatments except the private-
unveriﬁable feedback treatment.22 On the other hand, the change in beliefs after no feedback is not
signiﬁcantly different from zero in any of the treatments.23
[Figure 2 about here.]
The regressions in Table 2 further explore the differences in the impact of feedback on beliefs
across treatments. The table shows that in terms of direction, agents tend to discount the principal’s
feedback in all the treatments: positive feedback is interpreted less optimistically than truthful posi-
tive feedback and negative feedback less pessimistically. However, in response to positive feedback,
the change in beliefs under private-veriﬁable feedback is not signiﬁcantly different from that under
truthful feedback, while all the other treatments induce signiﬁcantly lower beliefs than truthful pos-
itive feedback (see column (1)).24 When subjects receive negative feedback, none of the treatments,
except private-unveriﬁable feedback, is different from truthful feedback. Under no feedback, on the
other hand, we ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcant difference across treatments.
[Table 2 about here.]
We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows:
Result 2. In all feedback mechanisms positive feedback increases and negative feedback decreases be-
liefs, but in private-unveriﬁable feedback these changes are insigniﬁcant. In all mechanisms, no feed-
back leads to only insigniﬁcant changes in beliefs. Predictions A.2 and B.2 are conﬁrmed except that
21Note that we collect data over different rounds from the same subject in all of the treatments. Thus, to account for
correlation, we use random effects model in regressions that use multiple observations from the same subject.
22The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for each treatment are as follows: Truthful with p = 0.0002 and p = 0.0002,
private-veriﬁablewith p = 0.0002 and p = 0.047, public-veriﬁablewith p = 0.002 and p = 0.003, public-unveriﬁablewith p =
0.005 and p = 0.090, private-unveriﬁable with p = 0.236 and p = 0.487, for positive and negative feedback cases respectively.
23The p-values of Wilcoxon signed rank test for each treatment are p = 0.211, p = 0.980, p = 0.674, p = 0.710, for private-
veriﬁable, public-veriﬁable, private-unveriﬁable, and public-unveriﬁable, respectively.
24Note, however, that the coefﬁcient of public-veriﬁable feedback is only marginally signiﬁcant.
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no feedback does not decrease beliefs in veriﬁable feedback and positive feedback increases beliefs in
public-unveriﬁable feedback.
The above ﬁndings suggest that public feedback can have quite different effects than private feed-
back. To explore this further, we look at whether beliefs are affected by the feedback provided to the
other agent in public feedback treatments. Figures 3a and 3b show, for each type of own feedback
received, whether beliefs respond to the other person’s feedback in veriﬁable and unveriﬁable cases,
respectively. We can see that in both treatments beliefs are affected adversely when the other agent
has received positive feedback as opposed to negative feedback. Secondly, the magnitude of this ef-
fect is larger under unveriﬁable feedback than under veriﬁable feedback.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2 test whether, in public feedback treatments, the other agent’s feed-
back makes a difference in belief updating, when own feedback is positive and negative, respectively.
The results support the conclusions we have drawn from Figure 3 and further show that the adverse
effect of the other agent’s positive feedback is signiﬁcant only if own feedback is positive as well and
that the effect is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level in public-veriﬁable feedback. Column (4) of Table
2 also shows that the less optimistic response to veriﬁable positive feedback, i.e., the negative co-
efﬁcient of public-veriﬁable feedback in column (1), comes from observations where own positive
feedback is accompanied with positive feedback to the other agent.25
Therefore, we conclude that:
Result 3. In public feedback, beliefs are affected adversely when the other agent also receives positive
feedback. This effect is stronger if own feedback is also positive and larger under unveriﬁable feedback.
Therefore, Prediction A.3 is rejected.
5.1.3 Impact of Beliefs and Feedback on Performance
Although it is not the focus of our study, we also examine how beliefs and feedback affect second-
round performance. Note that in our experiment, only the agents whose posterior beliefs are larger
than a randomly determined threshold perform in the second round and the rest simply receive a
randomly determined payoff. In order to minimize ability-based selection and to be able to observe
the effect of beliefs on the second-round performance for a relatively unbiased set of subjects, the
random device in the belief elicitation mechanism was skewed toward inducing subjects to enter.26
Consequently, 87% of the subjects performed in the second round. Table 3 shows that, controlling
for the ﬁrst round performance, higher beliefs lead to higher second-round performance, and hence
the principal has an additional incentive to induce higher beliefs. We also checked the impact of
feedback on performance, both overall and in each treatment separately, and found no signiﬁcant
effect. (These results are available upon request.) Overall, although our experiment is not designed
to analyze this issue, we have the following result.
Result 4. Inducing higher beliefs increases performance but interim performance feedback is not an
effective tool in this respect.
25These results are robust to taking the dependent variable to be the posterior beliefs and controlling for the prior beliefs
as a regressor.
26Note that this does not affect the incentive compatibility of the mechanism.
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[Table 3 about here.]
5.2 Analysis of Principals’ Behavior
We now turn to explore the principals’ side. We ﬁrst categorize the messages sent by the principals
under different feedback mechanisms, depending on the actual outcome (Table 4). As expected, if the
actual outcome is success and the principal can privately convey it, a positive message is transmitted
in almost all cases, both veriﬁable (97%) and unveriﬁable (94%). The percentage of positive messages
under public feedback when the actual outcome is success is somewhat lower (82% in veriﬁable and
85% in unveriﬁable). This difference between private and public reporting is statistically signiﬁcant
only in the veriﬁable case (p = 0.045 in veriﬁable and p = 0.265 in unveriﬁable feedback, according to
a test of proportions).
[Table 4 about here.]
Table 4 shows that principals prefer to transmit information 44% of the time when the outcome
is failure in the private-veriﬁable case, while the frequency of transmission is 57% under public-
veriﬁable feedback. So in both cases, around half of the time the bad outcome is revealed. This
might be either because in equilibrium veriﬁable negative feedback and no feedback are interpreted
similarly, or more likely because some principals have a preference for reporting truthfully.
Similarly, Table 4 shows that when the outcome is failure principals lie and give positive feedback
in 54% of the cases in private-unveriﬁable and 38% of the cases in public-unveriﬁable feedback. On
the other hand, when the outcome is success, they report truthfully in 94% of the cases in private-
unveriﬁable and 85% of the cases in public-unveriﬁable feedback. This is again consistent with lying
aversion. A Pearson chi-square test shows that reports signiﬁcantly change according to the actual
outcome when talk is cheap (p = 0.0003 in private-unveriﬁable and p = 0.0002 in public-unveriﬁable
feedback). This conﬁrms that principals consider the actual outcome in reporting, rather than send-
ing random or always positive signals regardless of the true state.
Although the number of observations is small, Table 5 and 6 provide further detail that may help
identify the reporting strategies used by the subjects. It seems that when the outcome is success
principals always report truthfully, whereas when the outcome is failure, some report truthfully, some
lie if they can, and others report no information.
[Table 5 about here.]
[Table 6 about here.]
Our design also allows us to observe the expectations of the principals regarding how agents will
update their beliefs. This can potentially give insights into the rationale behind the principals’ strat-
egy. As shown in Figure 4, principals expect the positive feedback they send to be interpreted more
optimistically than it actually is (although this is not signiﬁcant in a Wilcoxon test), and negative mes-
sages to be evaluated signiﬁcantly more pessimistically (p = 0.003 in a Wilcoxon test). Thus, princi-
pals generally overestimate the response of agents’ beliefs to the feedback, especially when the feed-
back is negative. The expectation of a pessimistic response to negative feedback reveals that at least
some principals take into account its adverse effect on beliefs but provide negative feedback anyway,
which is consistent with an aversion to lying.
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[Figure 4 about here.]
Finally, we examine principals’ expectations regarding how agents’ beliefs will be inﬂuenced by
the feedback given to the other agent. As Table 7 shows, principals expect that a positive feedback to
the other agent will adversely inﬂuence the beliefs of an agent when his own feedback is also positive
and when feedback is public and unveriﬁable, but expect no signiﬁcant impact if own feedback is
negative or feedback is veriﬁable.27 Interestingly, this is a feature of the equilibrium of the model with
lying costs and naive agents, which will be analyzed in Section 6.
[Table 7 about here.]
We can summarize our ﬁndings as follows.
Result 5. Some principals prefer to tell the truth even when they know that this might adversely affect
their payoff. Prediction A.4 is conﬁrmed but B.3 is rejected.
6 Discussion
Overall, our theoretical model in Section 4 does a good job in terms of explaining the relative informa-
tiveness of different feedback mechanisms. There are, however, three major discrepancies between
our theoretical predictions and empirical ﬁndings: (1) Some principals report truthfully even when
they believe that this may hurt them; (2) Agents do not interpret “no feedback” as pessimistically
as the theory suggests; (3) Positive feedback is interpreted less optimistically if the other agent also
receives positive feedback and this effect is stronger in public-unveriﬁable than in public-veriﬁable
feedback.
The ﬁnding that some principals have a tendency to tell the truth is in line with previous empir-
ical studies of strategic communication and suggests that individuals suffer from cost of lying and
this cost varies among them. The second ﬁnding might be due to naiveté in belief formation, i.e.,
agents interpret the feedback literally and when they receive “no information”, they keep their pri-
ors more or less unchanged. Another ﬁnding that supports the naive agent hypothesis is that, even
in private-veriﬁable feedback, a signiﬁcant fraction of principals provide no information when the
agent has failed. Since “no information” and negative feedback must both be interpreted in the same
(pessimistic) way in private-veriﬁable feedback, this is not rational if there is even a minimal prefer-
ence for telling the truth. If, however, principals believe that some of the agents are naive, then this
may be optimal. Indeed, Figure 4 and the preceding discussion have indicated that principals expect
agents to respond to feedback in a somewhat naive way. Therefore, we conclude that at least some
agents are naive and that principals expect them to act naively. The third ﬁnding could be due to
the fact that agents make (non-Bayesian) social comparisons in forming their beliefs or they believe
that the difﬁculty of the tasks are correlated in such a way that if the other agent has succeeded, then
probability of own success in the next task is smaller. Another possible explanation of this ﬁnding is
that agents are rational and such beliefs simply follow from the principals’ strategy and Bayes’ rule.
In the next section we extend our theoretical model to allow for individual-speciﬁc cost of lying
(and cost of withholding information) for the principals and naiveté on the part of the agents. We will
27Note, however, that the number of observations is small in some of these regressions.
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see that such an extension can account for most of our empirical ﬁndings as well as some of the above
discrepancies between the predictions of the original model and the data.
6.1 Cost of Lying and Naive Agents
Suppose that lying or providing no information has an individual speciﬁc cost associated with it. Let
c(r |θ) be the cost of sending report r when the state is θ and assume that it is distributed according to
the probability distribution Fr |θ in the population. Also assume that (1) telling the truth is costless; (2)
there are some individuals for whom the cost of lying is small; (3) there are some who always prefer
to tell the truth; (4) there are some for whom the difference between the cost of lying and cost of
withholding information is small enough; and (5) there are some who prefer withholding information
to lying.28
A fraction η ∈ (0,1) of agents are naive, i.e., they believe that the state is exactly equal to the prin-
cipal’s report and if the report is “no information”, then they keep their prior unchanged. Let qi (r |θ)
denote the fraction of principals with type θ who send report r to agent i in private feedback, and
q(r |θ) denote the same fraction in public feedback.
Before we present our results, we should brieﬂy discuss the few existing theoretical studies of
cheap talk games with lying costs and naive agents. Kartik et al. [2007] show that if the message space
is not bounded, then there is a fully revealing equilibrium. Our message space is bounded, which
makes full information revelation impossible in the unveriﬁable feedback case. Kartik [2009] assumes
that the sender has a convex cost of lying and characterizes a class of monotone equilibria in which
low types separate while high types pool. Chen [2011] analyzes a related model in which the sender
is honest and the receiver is naive with positive probabilities and shows that dishonest senders exag-
gerate the state of the world. Our results do not immediately follow from these two studies because
we assume both cost of lying and naive agents and allow cost of lying to differ among senders. Also,
we allow sending “no information” and analyze veriﬁable messages as well as cheap talk.
6.1.1 Veriﬁable Feedback with Lying Cost and Naive Agents
As the following result shows, under private-veriﬁable feedback, equilibrium behavior is uniquely
determined.
Proposition 5. If feedback is private and veriﬁable, then for any i and θ−i
qi (s|s,θ−i )= 1, qi (| f ,θ−i )> 0, qi ( f | f ,θ−i )> 0.
Therefore, in equilibrium, if the agent is successful, then the principal gives positive feedback,
while if he has failed, then those principals with small costs of withholding information give no feed-
back while those with large costs report failure. Proportion of principals who give no feedback in-
creases in the fraction of naive agents and the extra beneﬁt of letting the agent keep the prior beliefs.
Note that in our model of Section 4, which assumed lying is costless, behavior of the principal when
28These assumptions are equivalent to the following: (1) Fθ|θ(x) = 1 for all x ≥ 0; (2) Fr |θ(x) > 0 for all r,θ
and x > 0; (3) Fr |θ(v(a1(1),a2(1),θ)− v(a1(0),a2(0),θ) < 1; (4) c(s,r−i | f ,θ−i )− c(,r−i | f ,θ−i ) is a non-negative ran-
dom variable with probability distribution G
(
.|r−i ,θ−i
)
such that G
(
x|r−i ,θ−i
) > 0 for all r−i ,θ−i and x > 0; (5)
G
(
v(ai (1),a−i (μ−i (r−i )), f ,θ−i )− v(ai (0),a−i (μ−i (r−i )), f ,θ−i )|r−i ,θ−i
)< 1 for all r−i ,θ−i .
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the agent has failed was indeterminate, i.e., sending negative feedback and no feedback were both
compatible with equilibrium. In the current model, principal’s behavior is unique given his cost of
lying. Also note that if there were no naive agents, then in equilibrium we would not observe any
principal who provides no feedback.
Proposition 5 and Bayes’ rule imply that beliefs signiﬁcantly increase after positive feedback and
decrease after negative feedback, while beliefs after no feedback decrease but at a magnitude smaller
than beliefs after negative feedback. Beliefs conditional on success increase and conditional on fail-
ure decrease. (See Appendix A for the calculation of beliefs in this section.)
Equilibrium behavior is also unique in public-veriﬁable feedback.
Proposition 6. If feedback is public and veriﬁable, then q(ss|ss)= 1, q(| f f )> 0, and q( f f | f f )> 0.
If
η2v(a1(p),a2(p), s f )+2η(1−η)v(a1(p),a2(0), s f )+ (1−η)2v(a1(0),a2(0), s f )
> v(a1(1),a2(0), s f ) (1)
then, q(|s f )> 0 and q(| f s)> 0. If condition (1) does not hold, then there is an equilibrium in which
q(|s f )= q(| f s)= 0.
This result shows that if both agents are successful, then the principal truthfully reports it. If both
have failed, then some tell the truth while others give no feedback. The fraction of principals who
provide no feedback increases with the prior and the proportion of naive agents.
Behavior of the principal when only one of the agents has succeeded depends on condition (1),
which is likely to hold if the fraction of naive agents is high and the agents’ action are complements.
Since in our experiment there are strong complementarities between the agents’ actions, we expect
this condition to hold and hence some principals with types s f and f s to give no feedback. This is
exactly the type of behavior we observe in the data (see Table 6).
Therefore, we assume that condition (1) holds, in which case Bayes’ rule implies that beliefs in-
crease after positive feedback and decrease after negative feedback. Direction of change in beliefs
after no feedback is ambiguous, but they decrease less than they do in private-veriﬁable feedback. If
beliefs about the other agent is uniform, then average beliefs conditional on failure is smaller than
the prior but it is not clear whether beliefs conditional on success is greater than the prior.
In summary, we have the following predictions:
Prediction D. If lying is costly and some agents are naive, then in veriﬁable feedback:
1. If feedback is private, beliefs increase conditional on success and decrease conditional on fail-
ure. If feedback is public, beliefs decrease conditional on failure but the magnitude of change is
smaller than it is under private feedback;
2. Beliefs increase after positive feedback and decrease after negative feedback. If feedback is private,
beliefs also decrease after no feedback;
3. Beliefs after negative feedback are smaller than beliefs after no feedback;
4. If feedback is public, beliefs do not depend on the feedback provided to the other agent;
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5. If feedback is private, all principals report truthfully to the agent who succeeds while some report
truthfully and some give no feedback to the agent who fails. If feedback is public, all principals
report truthfully if both agents succeed, while some tell the truth and some give no feedback if
one of the agents fails.
Our empirical ﬁndings verify prediction D.1 (see Figure 1) as well as D.2 and D.3 (see Figure 2),
except that the decrease in beliefs after no feedback is not statistically signiﬁcant in private feedback.
Note that prediction D.3 is novel in the new model and follows from the existence of naive agents.
Also note that in the data, beliefs after no feedback increase in public-veriﬁable feedback, which can-
not be explained with our original model. In the model with lying costs, this could happen if each
agent assigns a disproportionately high likelihood to the event that he has succeeded and the other
has failed, i.e., agent 1 believes that the state is s f while agent 2 believes that it is f s. Finally, while pre-
diction D.5 is veriﬁed (see Tables 5 and 6), D.4 is rejected (see Figure 3a and Table 2 columns (4) and
(5)). Overall, empirical observations are very close to theoretical predictions except that in the data
beliefs are somewhat more pessimistic if own positive feedback is accompanied by positive feedback
to the other agent.
6.1.2 Unveriﬁable Feedback with Lying Cost and Naive Agents
The most signiﬁcant difference between the models with and without lying costs appears under un-
veriﬁable feedback. In particular, and unlike the original model, the model with lying costs and naive
agents uniquely pins down the principal’s behavior under private-unveriﬁable feedback. If the agent
is successful, the principal sends positive feedback and if he has failed, then those with high costs
of lying and withholding information report truthfully, those with small costs of lying report success,
and those with larger costs of lying but small costs of withholding give no feedback.
Proposition 7. If feedback is private and unveriﬁable, then for any i and θ−i
qi (s|s,θ−i )= 1, qi (s| f ,θ−i )> 0, qi (| f ,θ−i )> 0, qi ( f | f ,θ−i )> 0.
Equilibrium behavior under public-unveriﬁable feedback may not be unique. However, if v is
separable, i.e., v(a,θ)> v(a′,θ) implies v(a,θ′)> v(a′,θ′), then the following is true.
Proposition 8. If v is separable and feedback is public and unveriﬁable, then q(ss|ss)= 1, q(ss|θ)> 0
for some θ = ss and qi (θ|θ)> 0 for all θ.
A natural extension of the private-unveriﬁable feedback equilibrium to public case along the lines
suggested by Proposition 8 is the following: (1) Type ss sends ss; (2) Type f f sends ss, , or f f ; (3)
Type s f sends ss, s, or s f ; (4) Type f s sends ss, s, or f s. This is exactly the type of behavior we
observe in the data. Therefore, we assume that this is the equilibrium that our subjects play.
Using Bayes’ rule to derive the beliefs, we have the following prediction.
Prediction E. If lying is costly and some agents are naive, then in unveriﬁable feedback:
1. Beliefs conditional on success are smaller than those in private-veriﬁable feedback;
2. Beliefs after positive feedback are smaller than those in veriﬁable feedback;
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3. Beliefs decrease after negative and no feedback at a magnitude similar to those in veriﬁable neg-
ative feedback;
4. Beliefs after positive feedback are smaller if the other agent receives positive feedback as well,
while beliefs after negative feedback are not affected by the feedback to the other agent;
5. All principals report truthfully to the agent who succeeds but, to the agent who fails, some prin-
cipals report success, some no information and some failure.
Our empirical ﬁndings verify predictions E.1 (see Figure 1) andE.2. PredictionE.3 is not supported
because the decrease in beliefs after negative or no feedback is smaller compared with veriﬁable feed-
back (see Figure 2). Except for a few outliers, Tables 5 and 6 give strong support to E.5. Perhaps most
remarkably, item E.4 is strongly supported (see Figure 3b and Table 2 columns (4) and (5)). Note that
this prediction is novel to the new model and follows from the fact that feedback (s, f ) is given only by
the principal who observed (s, f ) whereas (s, s) is given by types (s, s), (s, f ), ( f , s), and ( f , f ). There-
fore, a Bayesian agent 1 who receives feedback (s, f ) is sure that he succeeded, while if he receives
feedback (s, s), then he assigns a positive probability that he failed. Finally, the new model, as well
as the original one, predicts the private-veriﬁable feedback to be the most informative mechanism,
which is supported by our ﬁndings.
Overall, the model ﬁts the data quite well, and in some respects better than the original model, but
there are still two deviations of the model’s predictions from what we observe in the data: (1) Agents
interpret other agent’s success pessimistically even in veriﬁable feedback; (2) Agents do not interpret
negative or no feedback as pessimistically as they should, particularly in private-unveriﬁable feed-
back.
6.2 Are Agents Bayesian?
Suppose that agents know (or predict) the strategy employed by the principals in our experiment and
use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs. How would their beliefs change upon observing feedback?
How do actual beliefs compare with such Bayesian beliefs?
In order to answer these questions, we estimate the principals’ strategy using the data in Table
5 and 6 and then use each agents’ pre-feedback beliefs, the feedback they received, and Bayes’ rule
to calculate post-feedback beliefs.29 Before we start presenting our ﬁndings, we should stress that we
are subjecting the agents to quite a stringent test. A perfect ﬁt between the actual and Bayesian beliefs
requires not only that they use Bayes’ rule correctly to update their beliefs but also that they predict
the principals’ strategy perfectly.
Figure 5 plots the average change in actual and Bayesian beliefs in each treatment conditional
on the actual outcome of the agent. We can see that the direction of change is the same in actual
and Bayesian beliefs, except under unveriﬁable feedback when the actual outcome is failure. Also,
compared with the Bayesian case, overall information transmission is much weaker when the actual
state is failure.30
29In calculating principals’ strategy we eliminated some outliers in tables 5 and 6: in private-veriﬁable, row SF column No
Info,Info; in private-unveriﬁable, row FS column SNo; in public-unveriﬁable, row SS column NoS, row FS columns SF and
SNo, row SF columns FF and NoF.
30We should note that the scale of the graphs in 5a and 5b are different because agents update their beliefs by amounts
that are much smaller than the theoretical ones. For example, under truthful feedback, Bayes’ rule requires that beliefs go
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[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 6 plots average change in actual and Bayesian beliefs in response to feedback. We again
see that the direction of change in beliefs is the same in actual and Bayesian beliefs (except those
in public-veriﬁable and private-unveriﬁable treatments after no feedback). This ﬁgure also supports
our conclusion from the previous section that agents do not interpret negative or no feedback as
pessimistically as they should, especially when they are unveriﬁable.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Finally, we compare the change in beliefs in response to the other agent’s feedback in public-
unveriﬁable feedback. As Figure 7 shows, as long as the direction of change in the beliefs are con-
cerned, agents on average act in a Bayesian manner. However, and as we have discovered before,
they seem to interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than is justiﬁed by
Bayesian updating alone.
[Figure 7 about here.]
In Table 8, we present regression results which show that Bayesian updating plays a signiﬁcant
role in the formation of actual beliefs and explains about 20% of their total variation. We also see that,
together with the prior, Bayesian updating explains about half of the total variation in the posterior
beliefs. Furthermore, the relationship between actual and Bayesian beliefs do not depend on the
feedback mechanism in a signiﬁcant way.
[Table 8 about here.]
Overall, we conclude that agents’ beliefs are consistent with the strategy employed by the princi-
pals and Bayesian updating, except that they respond to negative or no feedback more optimistically
and interpret positive feedback to the other agent more pessimistically than they should. However,
Bayesian updating does not explain the entire variation in beliefs. This could be due to agents’ inabil-
ity to correctly anticipate the principal’s strategy, their naiveté, or other biases they suffer in process-
ing information, such as self-serving biases and non-Bayesian social comparisons.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we employ a theoretical model and data from a laboratory experiment to examine the
role of veriﬁability and privacy in strategic interim performance feedback. Our baseline theoretical
model predicts that information about agents’ performances can be credibly revealed only when the
performance information is veriﬁable and, furthermore, private-veriﬁable feedback is the most infor-
mative mechanism. These predictions are strongly supported by our empirical analysis.
up to 1 after success and down to 0 after failure, whereas in reality they go up to 0.77 and down to 0.57, respectively. This
is simply because in the theoretical model beliefs refer to the probability that they have been successful in the task they
have just ﬁnished, while in the experiment they measure the probability with which they believe they will be successful
in the next task. We expect the latter to be strictly increasing in the former but not necessarily identical with it. Also note
that numbers in Figure 5a are slightly different than those in Figure 1. This is because we had to drop a few observations
for which we could not apply Bayes’ rule in calculating beliefs. In order to maintain comparability between the actual and
Bayesian beliefs we also dropped those observations in calculating the average change in actual beliefs. These comments
also apply to the the other graphs in this section.
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However, the baseline model cannot account for some interesting features of the data: (1) many
principals tell the truth even when they believe this may hurt them; (2) agents do not interpret “no
feedback” as pessimistically as they should; and (3) positive feedback is interpreted less optimisti-
cally if the other agent has also received positive feedback, and this effect is stronger in the case of
public-unveriﬁable than in the case of public-veriﬁable feedback. We then analyze a model with
individual-speciﬁc lying costs and naive agents, and show that it can account for many of these ﬁnd-
ings. We also ﬁnd that while many agents do take into account the principal’s strategic behavior to
form beliefs in a Bayesian fashion, some are naive and act in a non-Bayesian manner, particularly
when informed about other agents’ feedback. From a more practical point of view, we conclude that
credible communication of interim performance requires veriﬁability and it is best to keep feedback
private.
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Table 1: Information Transmission in Different Treatments
Dependent var: (1) (2)
Change in beliefs Success Failure
Private-Veriﬁable -3.786 4.321
(2.789) (3.784)
Public-Veriﬁable -5.039∗ 5.796
(2.661) (3.896)
Private-Unveriﬁable -8.822∗∗∗ 10.883∗∗∗
(2.845) (3.831)
Public-Unveriﬁable -11.123∗∗∗ 10.745∗∗∗
(2.740) (4.094)
Session YES YES
N 195 252
χ2 27.145 22.272
GLS Regressions, standard errors in parentheses
Baseline is truthful feedback
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 2: Impact of Feedback on Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief Change in belief
(Positive feedback) (Negative Feedback) (No Feedback) (Own positive feedback) (Own negative feedback)
Private-Veriﬁable -2.318 2.391 -1.079 -0.759 2.926
(2.945) (5.519) (4.408) (2.842) (5.460)
Private-Unveriﬁable -9.383∗∗∗ 12.224∗∗ -0.449 -7.697∗∗∗ 12.116∗∗
(2.599) (5.552) (5.828) (2.479) (5.445)
Public-Veriﬁable -5.017∗ 1.673 3.055
(2.879) (5.063) (4.617)
Public-Unveriﬁable -6.500∗∗ 4.101
(2.778) (6.176)
PUBLIC-VERIFIABLE
Other positive feedback -6.090∗ -2.029
(3.565) (5.992)
Other negative feedback -1.170 7.033
(3.524) (7.129)
PUBLIC-UNVERIFIABLE
Other positive feedback -6.909∗∗ -5.040
(3.143) (8.665)
Other negative feedback 3.376 12.992
(5.078) (9.353)
Session YES YES YES YES YES
N 207 149 91 207 149
χ2 21.788 15.753 . 23.927 18.988
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for Different Feedback Mechanisms
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: Impact of Beliefs on Performance
(1)
Post-feedback Performance
Pre-feedback Performance 0.442***
(0.049)
Change in beliefs 0.013*
(0.008)
Session YES
N 392
χ2 130.599
GLS regressions, standard errors in parentheses
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 4: Feedback to Individual Agents under Different Treatments
Private-Veriﬁable Public-Veriﬁable Private-Unveriﬁable Public-Unveriﬁable
(message) (message) (message) (message)
Actual Info No Info Total Info No Info Total S F No Total S F No Total
S 31 1 32 31 7 38 30 0 2 32 29 2 3 34
(96.88) (3.13) (39.02) (81.58) (18.42) (46.34) (93.75) (0.00) (6.25) (39.02) (85.29) (5.88) (8.82) (45.95)
F 22 28 50 25 19 44 27 17 6 50 15 10 15 40
(44.00) (56.00) (60.98) (56.82) (43.18) (53.66) (54.00) (34.00) (12.00) (60.98) (37.50) (25.00) (37.50) (54.05)
Total 53 29 56 26 57 17 8 44 12 18
(64.63) (35.37) (68.29) (31.71) (69.51) (20.73) (9.76) (59.46) (16.22) (24.32)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message.
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Table 5: Feedback to Both Agents in Private Feedback
Private-Veriﬁable (message) Private-Unveriﬁable (message)
Actual Both Info Info,No Info No Info, Info Both No Info SS SF FS FF No-No SNo NoS FNo NoF
SS 5 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (100.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SF 7 4 1 0 7 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
(58.33) (33.33) (8.33) (0.00) (77.78) (11.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (11.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FS 5 0 5 0 4 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 0
(50.00) (0.00) (50.00) (0.00) (36.36) (0.00) (45.45) (0.00) (0.00) (18.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FF 4 1 0 9 5 1 0 5 1 1 2 0 0
(28.57) (7.14) (0.00) (64.29) (33.33) (6.67) (0.00) (33.33) (6.67) (6.67) (13.33) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses
The abbreviations in message part represents message pairs.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message. SNo refers to (Successful, No message) message pair.
Table 6: Feedback to Both Agents in Public Feedback
Public-Veriﬁable (message) Public-Unveriﬁable (message)
Actual Both Info Both No Info SS SF FS FF No-No SNo NoS FNo NoF
SS 8 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
(100.00) (0.00) (75.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (25.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SF 6 3 4 3 0 1 0 4 0 0 1
(66.67) (33.33) (30.77) (23.08) (0.00) (7.69) (0.00) (30.77) (0.00) (0.00) (7.69)
FS 9 4 7 1 3 0 0 1 1 0 0
(69.23) (30.77) (53.85) (7.69) (23.08) (0.00) (0.00) (7.69) (7.69) (0.00) (0.00)
FF 5 6 1 0 0 1 5 0 0 0 0
(45.45) (54.55) (14.29) (0.00) (0.00) (14.29) (71.43) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Number of agents receiving each message type, percentages in parentheses
The abbreviations in message part represents message pairs.
S= Successful, F= Failed and No= No message. SNo refers to (Successful, No message) message pair.
Table 7: Principal’s Expectations in Public Feedback-Extended
Own Positive Feedback Own Negative Feedback
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Guess Guess Guess Guess Guess Guess
(Public-Veriﬁable) (Public-Unveriﬁable) (Public-Veriﬁable) (Public-Unveriﬁable)
Other Positive Feedback -3.151 3.708 -10.195∗∗ -1.550 -0.333 -3.323
(3.198) (5.692) (4.176) (8.969) (7.903) (17.649)
Public-Veriﬁable 10.188∗∗∗ 4.722
(2.960) (3.169)
N 75 31 44 37 25 12
χ2 14.735 0.424 5.959 2.250 0.002 0.035
Standard errors in parentheses
GLS Regressions for Different Feedback Mechanisms
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: Post-Feedback Beliefs
(1) (2) (3)
Post-Feedback Post-Feedback Post-Feedback
Belief Belief Belief
Bayesian Belief 0.198∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
Pre-Feedback Belief 0.655∗∗∗ 0.649∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.059)
Private-Veriﬁable 1.723
(2.724)
Public-Veriﬁable -0.433
(3.028)
Private-Unveriﬁable 0.362
(2.819)
Public-Unveriﬁable -1.278
(2.749)
N 386 386 386
χ2 67.137 213.684 232.519
R2 0.205 0.544 0.545
GLS Regressions, standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Figure 1: Information Transmission in Different Treatments
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Figure 2: Impact of Feedback on Beliefs
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Figure 3: Change in Beliefs in Public Feedback
(a) Public-Veriﬁable Feedback
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(b) Public-Unveriﬁable Feedback
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Figure 4: Difference between Principal’s Guess and Actual Belief
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Figure 5: Information Transmission: Actual vs. Bayesian
(a) Actual Beliefs
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(b) Bayesian Beliefs
31.4
−66.1
27.6
−62.9
16.7
−42.1
3.5
−23.0
10.4
−24.9
−
60
−
40
−
20
0
20
40
Ch
an
ge
 in
 B
ay
es
ia
n 
be
lie
fs
Truthful Private
Verifiable
Public
Verifiable
Private
Unverifiable
Public
Unverifiable
by treatment
Change in Bayesian Beliefs with Actual Oucome
Success Failure
Figure 6: Change in Beliefs with Feedback: Actual vs. Bayesian
(a) Actual Beliefs
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(b) Bayesian Beliefs
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Figure 7: Change in Beliefs with Other’s Feedback: Actual vs. Bayesian
(a) Actual Beliefs
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(b) Bayesian Beliefs
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